

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10106

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-398

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 96 104

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 245
Folder 14

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

9pm

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

21 JUN 94 Project Z RIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project Z RIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~will~~ ~~not~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement~~ ~~and utilization~~ ~~of~~ ~~code books~~ ~~other materials~~ in accordance with requirements issued by the Clandestine Services, ~~primarily~~, ~~the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background:

REC

JUN 24 1975

CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements

~~for the operational requirements of foreign clandestine~~

~~missions~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of

~~foreign~~ agents as a developmental activity. During the same

SECRET

2

period requirements [from USA] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the International [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted [REDACTED] sporadically [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ^{October} ~~September~~ 1968,

REC'D BY [REDACTED]

JUN 24 1975

CIA

SECRET

3

Qfmin annual salary : 7,200

Travel + ops expenses for

Qfmin + other agents + agent candidates : 2,000

Fees for services by and

standby of agents and

agent candidates : 2,000

Travel of staff employees +

engaged in Zorifle activity : 2,500

Hire of safehouses, automobiles

and other operational expenses : 1,000

14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

RECEI

JUN 24 1975

CIA

SECRET

4

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributable
bilateral.

2) Our own experience (~~in Europe~~) (+ opposition DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (~~Russia, Poland, France, Germany, etc.~~) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CE-experienced opac officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search & willing to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him
he should, + w/ paramount regard for operational security.
Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does ~~the agent~~ now
know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control,
search, training, case officiating, etc. - DDP authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for immaculate
cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility
of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with
~~own~~ (non-station) commo. Word of mouth +
no bailability re trips
(except for search)

d. No PA's, or intermediaries; rigid case-officing
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts. REUL

f. No use of ~~any~~ ^{any} agent who
ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training
by opposition would never... TA

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

~~Market~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

SECRET

[5]

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretend: [redacted] search; this establishes [redacted].
- j. No discussions in stations.
- k. No "team" until ready to go if stills.

4. Blackmail:

- a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.
- b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.
- c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
- d. Exclude organizations [redacted] criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those of unsuitability of purpose as criminals.
- e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning scors or backs in case of blow.

- f. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.
- g. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
- h. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will just be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

→ 9. [redacted] plan, 20% [redacted] to black-top [redacted], [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. [redacted] (sic)

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

Keeping of files.

~~SECRET~~

folded in to travel

6

Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems.

X KGB case.

not receive enough.

1) Maximum security + within Kubark only (e.g., how much does [redacted] know now?). Limitation on number [redacted]

Guise of [redacted] objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officed; no silk-sht PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizen or American resident for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selected in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Spain) has been examined.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

8) Planning should include provision for blanning Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. If above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

SECRET

7

10) ~~Conveniences recommended.~~ ~~The Man and the Job~~

~~Watches~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (All archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~All Cuban personnel involved should have some C.E. experience.~~

14) ~~Sufficiently + stable in~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals solo selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Too dangerous of standbys.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA

SECRET

26/1 - 25/1 - ~~exec action~~
"The Magic Button"
Narcotics Büro [redacted]

[8]

"for a living" - RIS 201 cover
Curtiss - Bankruptcy - no store
eyes - Jim A. [redacted] Contract struct /
not a TSD problem [redacted] from U-2 /

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
- Confession of weakness -
- El Benefactor → Assumptions -
Example 3 "mug"

Framework of [redacted] job
memo • [redacted]

[redacted] bear

REC'D - [redacted]

JUN 24 1975

CIA

Anesthesia -

26/1 - [redacted] Foreign 201 - Matter -

No fil Review - [redacted]

1. Select proper office to run -

2. [redacted]

May 2

3. Security Rules

B-WH-1-AS-³

4. Three levels

- Reserv.

d:32281946 Page 1, 2 Resort - Brakes - Selectable - 6-6-6

SECRET

6. No [REDACTED]
7. No projects or papers
except for cones.
8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] ?
[REDACTED] Project Draft LCH -
Ticket 1500 - from N.B.
Mark spot regn. Staff At
Project - abe Blisko
9. Dispersal -
10. Targets who & where -
Must know before
we can spot -
11. Case officering
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
- 7d) List - Remember

RECLER FROM

JUN 24 1975

CIA